晋升激励、产业同构与地方保护：一个基于政治控制权收益的解释

部分内容如下：

晋升激励、产业同构与地方保护：
一个基于政治控制权收益的解释
刘瑞明
（西北大学经济管理学院 710127）
内容摘要 本文在一个基于政治控制权收益为目标的晋升激励框架下，整合既有的理论认
识，利用一个模仿博弈模型，对长期存在于我国经济发展中的产业同构及其引发的地方保护与
市场分割现象给予一个完整解释。研究表明：在以政治控制权收益为目标的晋升激励体制下，
出于对政治控制权收益中的相对位置的考虑，在信息约束与风险规避条件下，地方政府官员将
采取模仿经济发展战略上的方式最大化自身利益。而这种经济模仿发展战略必然导致产业同构
的形成，这进一步引发地区企业在产品市场和原料市场的互相争夺，地方保护主义与人为的市
场分割也就成为不可避免的现象。在随后的经验验证中，历史资料支持了上述逻辑。最后，本
文指出：由于政府组织中对相对绩效的激励需要与政府主导型经济中道德风险的两难冲突，从
短期看，完善政府绩效评价体系将有利于缓解这一冲突，但长期来看，产权改革和市场环境的
维护才是出路所在。
关 键 词 晋升激励 政治控制权收益 经济模仿 产业同构 地方保护
Performance Based Incentives，Same Industrial Structure and Local Protection: An
Explanation under a Framework of Benefits of Political Control Rights
Liu Ruiming
Abstract: This paper investigates the same industrial structure at different region and the local
protection between them in china under a framework of performance based incentives. We show that,in the government pushed economic, if the relative performance be concluded in the contract that the
central government give to the local government officials, the local government officials will ignore
their own superior information that develop the local economic and “go with the flow” in order to
maximize there own benefits when they allocate the resources which they control. This will lead to the
same industrial structure and then local protection between them. It is harm to the economic growth in
china. Empirical study show that the logic we bring forward are right. In short run, perfect the
performance judged system will be relax the conflict between the demand of relative performance
evaluate in the government organization and the moral hazard in the government pushed economic,
but in long run, the reform of property rights is necessary.
Key Words: Performance Based Incentives; Benefits of Political Control; Herd Behaviour; Same
Industrial Structure ; Local Protection