监督还是建议——董事会功能的新认识

部分内容如下：

监督还是建议：董事会功能的新认识
Monitoring or Advising: A Rethink of the Roles of Board
[内容摘要]：
传统的董事会理论通过代理成本证明了董事会是解决公司代理问题的内生制度安排，强调董事会在公司治理中的监督职能。近来的董事会理论研究表明，董事会还扮演重要的建议角色，因此建立友好型董事会可能是合意的选择。本文通过一个简单的模型试图证明：不恰当地强化董事会的监督功能，将导致管理层隐藏真实信息，从而董事会的监督和建议功能都难以发挥作用；企业异质性的存在，导致董事会与管理层的博弈关系存在明显差异，对董事会的监督和建议的要求自然有差异，从而董事会结构也将存在差异。以该理论为基础，我们对中国上市公司的董事会效率进行了初步的实证分析，发现无论是国资委直属企业还是家族企业的董事会都是弱监督性的，但是后者的建议功能更强一些。
关键词：董事会 建议功能 监督功能
Abstract: Traditional theory considers that boards are an endogenously determined governance mechanism and emphasize monitor of management based on mitigation of agency costs. Recent research show that boards also play an important advisor role, management-friendly boards can be optimal. This paper tries to show that excess monitoring encourage CEO to hide real information and reduce firm value ,which by discouraging board from monitoring and advising based on a simple model .The different relationships between board and CEO in heterogeneous firms command different board composition for demand difference of monitoringand advising functions. Based on stylized fact of board composition in China, our empirical work supports several conclusions that the model tell us.
Key Words: Boards, Monitor, Advisor