Hardcover:
   760 pages
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (September 24, 2007)

Language: English
Book Description
In the last few years game theory has had a substantial impact on computer science, especially on Internet- and e-commerce-related issues. More than 40 of the top researchers in this field have written chapters that go from the foundations to the state of the art. Basic chapters on algorithmic methods for equilibria, mechanism design and combinatorial auctions are followed by chapters on incentives and pricing, cost sharing, information markets and cryptography and security. Students, researchers and practitioners alike need to learn more about these fascinating theoretical developments and their widespread practical application.

About the Author
Tim Roughgarden is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Computer Science at Stanford University. Vijay Vazirani got his Bachelor's degree in Computer Science from MIT in 1979 and his PhD from the University of California at Berkeley in 1983. The central theme in his research career has been the design of efficient algorithms. Additionally, he has also worked on complexity theory, cryptography, coding theory and game theory. In 2001 he published what is widely regarded as the definitive book on Approximation Algorithms; this book has been translated into Japanese, Polish and French. He is a Fellow of the ACM.
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Contents
Introduction, by Nisan/Roughgarden/Tardos/Vazirani. (outline)

Part I: Computing in Games
Chapter 1: Basic Solution Concepts and Computational Issues in Games, by Tardos/Vazirani. (outline)
Chapter 2: Algorithms for Equilibria, by Papadimitriou. (outline)
Chapter 3: Equilibrium Computation for Two-Player Games in Strategic and Extensive Form, by von Stengel. (outline)
Chapter 4: Learning, Regret Minimization, and Equilibria, by Blum/Mansour. (outline)
Chapter 5: Combinatorial Algorithms for Market Equilibria, by Vazirani. (outline)
Chapter 6: Computation of Market Equilibria by Convex Programming, by Codenotti/Varadarajan. (outline)
Chapter 7: Graphical Games, by Kearns. (outline)
Chapter 8: Cryptography and Game Theory, by Dodis/Rabin. (outline)

Part II: Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Chapter 9: Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists), by Nisan. (outline)
Chapter 10: Mechanism Design Without Money, by Schummer/Vohra. (outline)
Chapter 11: Combinatorial Auctions, by Blumrosen/Nisan. (outline)
Chapter 12: Computationally Efficient Approximation Mechanisms, by Lavi. (outline)
Chapter 13: Profit Maximization in Mechanism Design, by Hartline/Karlin. (outline)
Chapter 14: Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design, by Feigenbaum/Schapira/Shenker. (outline)
Chapter 15: Cost Sharing, by Jain/Mahdian. (outline)
Chapter 16: On-line Mechanisms, by Parkes. (outline)
All Part II Outlines
 

Part III: Quantifying the Inefficiency of Equilibria
Chapter 17: Introduction to the Inefficiency of Equillibria, by Roughgarden/Tardos. (outline)
Chapter 18: Routing Games, by Roughgarden. (outline)
Chapter 19: Network Formation Games, by Tardos and Wexler. (outline)
Chapter 20: Selfish Load Balancing, by Voecking. (outline)
Chapter 21: The Price of Anarchy and the Design of Scalable Resource Allocation Mechanisms, by Johari. (outline)
All Part III Outlines
 

Part IV: Additional Topics
Chapter 22: Incentives and Pricing in Communication Networks, by Ozdaglar/Srikant. (outline)
Chapter 23: Incentives in Peer-to-Peer Systems, by Babaioff/Chuang/Feldman. (outline)
Chapter 24: Cascading Behavior in Networks: Algorithmic and Economic Issues, by Kleinberg. (outline)
Chapter 25: Incentives and Information Security, by Anderson/Moore/Nagaraja/Ozment. (outline)
Chapter 26: Computational Aspects of Information Markets, by Pennock/Sami. (outline)
Chapter 27: Manipulation-Resistant Reputation Systems, by Friedman/Resnick/Sami. (outline)
Chapter 28: Sponsored Search Auctions, by Lahaie/Pennock/Saberi/Vohra. (outline)
Chapter 29: Computational Evolutionary Game Theory, by Suri. (outline)