1.2.1 Definition ofNash Equilibrium
1.2.2 Examples of Pure-Stratcgy Equilibria
1.2.3 Nonexistence()fa Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
1.2.4 Multiple Nash Equilibria, Focal Points, and Parcto
OptirnaliLy
1.2.5 Nlash Equilibrium as the Result of Learning or
Evolution
1.3 Existence and Properties of Nash Equilibria
1.3.1 Existence of a Mixed-Strategy F,quilibrium
1.3.2 The Nash-Equilibrium Correspondence Has a
Closed Graph
1.3,3 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Infinite Games
with C.onLinuous Payoffs
Exercises
Rcferences
1 Iterated Strici Dominance, Rationalizability, and
Correlated Equilibrium
2.1 Iteratcd Strict Dominance and Rationalizability
2.1.1 Iterated Strict Dominance: Definition and
Properties
2.1.2 An Application of lterated Strict Dominance
2.1.3 Rationalizability
2.1.4 Rationalizability and Iterated Strict Dominance
2.1.5 Discussion
2.2 Correlated Equilibrium
2-3 Rationalizability and Suhjective Correlated Equilibria
Exercises
Referenccs
JI Dynamic Ga巾es of Complete Information
3 Extenxivc-Form CJames
j． I I n t rod uction
3.2 (1()mmitment and Perfection in Multi-Stage Games with
()bscrvcd Actions
3.2.1 What Is a Multi-Stage Game'l
3./.2 RackWtLrd Induction and Subgamc Perfection
3.2.3 The Value of C.ommitmcnt and "Time Consistency"
3.3 'I.hc F.xtensive Form
3.3.1 Dcfinition
..3.2 Multi-Stagc Games with Ohscrved Actions
3,4 Strategies anci Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games
3.4.1 BehaviorSLrategies
3.4,2 The Strategic-Form Representation of Extensive-
F'orm Games
3.4.3 The Equivalence between Mixed and Behavior
Stratcgics in Games or Perfect Recalt
3.4.4 Iterated Strict Dominance and Nash Equilibrium
3.5 Backward Induction and Subgame Pcrfection
:{.6 Critiques oUlackward Induction and Subgame Perfection
3.6.1 Critiques of Backward Induction
3.6.2 ('ritiques ofSubgame Perfection
F,x ercises
RcFcrcnces
4 Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed
Aciions
4.1 Jncrc)duction
4.2 The Principle of Optimality and Subgame Perfection
4.3 A First Look at Repeated Games
4.3.1 The RepeaLed Prisoner's Dilemma
4.3.2 A F'initcly Repeated Game with Several Static
Equilibria
4.4 The Rubinstein-Stahl Bargaining Model
4.4.! A Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium
4.4.2 Uniqueness of the Infinite-Horizon Equilibrium
4.4.3 ComparativeStatics
4.5 Simplc Timing Games
4.5.1 Derinition of Simple Timing Games
4.5./ 'rhe War of Attrition
4.5.3 Preemption Games
4.6 lterated Conditional Dominance and the Rubinstein
Bargaining Game
4.7 0pcn-Loc)p and Closed-Loop Equilibria
4.7.1 Definitions
4,7.2 A Two-Period Example
4.7.3 0pen-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Games
with Many Players
4.8 Finire- H orizon and Infinite- H orizon Equilibria
Lxercises
References
5 Rcpcatcd Games
5.1 Repeated Games with Observable Actions
5.1.1 The Model
5.1.2 The Folk Theorem for Inrinitely Repeated Games
5.1.3 Characterization ofthe Equilibrium Set
5.2 Finitely Repeated Games
5.3 Rcpcalcd Games with Varying OpponcnLs
5.3.1 Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Player<
5.3.2 Games with Overlapping Generations of Players
5.3.3 Randomly Matched Opponents
5.4 Pareto Perfection and Renegotiation-Proofness in
Rcpcatcd Games
5.4.1 Introduction
5.4,2 Pareto Perfection in Finitely Repeated Games
5.4.3 RenegoLiation-Proofness in Inrinitely Repeated Games
5.j Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Information
5,5,1 The Model
5.5.2 Trigger-Price Strategies
5.5.3 Public Strategies and Public Equilibria
5.5.4 Dynamic Programming and Selr-Generation
5.6 The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
5.7 Changing the Information Structure with the Time Period
F:xcrciscs
References
III Static Games of Incomplete Information
6 Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium
f).l Incomplete Information
6.2 Example 6.1: Providing a Public Good under Incomplete
Inrormation
6.3 The Notions of Type and Strategy
^4 Ila}-csian F.quilibrium
(..5 11'Llrthcr Lxamplcs or Bayesian Equilibria
fi.(] I)clction oF Strictly Dominated Strategies
6.6.1 Inlcrim vs. Ex Ante Dominance
^6.2 I{xamplcs {,f lterared Strict Dominancc
^7 L J.,ing Baycsian Equitihria to Justify Mixed Equilibria
(17.! lixamplcs
f1.7.2 Purification Thcorem
t).h 'I'hc Disc ributional Approach
f{xcrchcs
Rcrcrcncc.
7 I¨ycsian Games and Mechanism Design
7.1 plcs‘)r Mcchanism Design
7.1.1 Nonlinear Pricing
7.1./ Auctions
7.2 Mcchanihm Dcsign and the Revelation Principle
7.1 Mcchanism Dcsign with a Single Agent
7.3.1 Implementable Decisions and Aliocations
7.3.2 0ptimal Mechanisms
7.4 Mcchanism/, with Several Agents: F'easible Allocations,
Hudget Balance, ancl Efficiency
7.4.1 Fcasibility under Budgct Balance
7.4.2 Dominant Strategy vs. Bayesian Mechanisms
7.4..3 F.fliciencyTheorems
7.4.4 IncfficicncyTheorems
7.4.5 Ef'riciency Limit Theorems
7.4.6 Strong Inefllciency Limit Theorems
7.5 Mcchanism Design with Several Agents: Optimization
7.5.1 Auctions
7.5./ FfTicicnt Bargaining Processes
7.() F'urthcr Topics in Mech:inism Design
7 6.[ (1('rrcl:ited Types
7.(,.2 Risk Aversion
7.f).3 Informed Principal
7.6.4 Dynamic Mechanism Design
7.n。5 ('omrnonAgency
AppcncliA
l:xcrciHCx
Rcfcrcnces |
