This text introduces current evolutionary game theory—where ideas from evolutionary biology
and rationalistic economics meet—emphasizing the links between static and dynamic
approaches and noncooperative game theory. Much of the text is devoted to the key concepts of
evolutionary stability and replicator dynamics. The former highlights the role of mutations and
the latter the mechanisms of selection. Moreover, set-valued static and dynamic stability
concepts, as well as processes of social evolution, are discussed. Separate background
chapters are devoted to noncooperative game theory and the theory of ordinary differential
equations. There are examples throughout as well as individual chapter summaries.
Because evolutionary game theory is a fast-moving field that is itself branching out and rapidly
evolving, Jörgen Weibull has judiciously focused on clarifying and explaining core elements of
the theory in an up-to-date, comprehensive, and self-contained treatment. The result is a text
for second-year graduate students in economic theory, other social sciences, and evolutionary
biology. The book goes beyond filling the gap between texts by Maynard-Smith and Hofbauer
and Sigmund that are currently being used in the field.
Evolutionary Game Theory will also serve as an introduction for those embarking on research
in this area as well as a reference for those already familiar with the field. Weibull provides an
overview of the developments that have taken place in this branch of game theory, discusses
the mathematical tools needed to understand the area, describes both the motivation and
intuition for the concepts involved, and explains why and how it is relevant to economics.