contents
preface

• chapter one: An overview

part I: Individual and social choice

• chapter two: The theory of consumer choice and demand  Prologue to part I 17
• chapter three: Choice under uncertainty

• chapter eleven: Modeling competitive situations
• chapter twelve: Solution concepts for noncooperative games 387
• chapter thirteen: Incomplete information and irrationality 463
• chapter fourteen: Repeated play: Cooperation and reputation 503
• chapter fifteen: Bilateral bargaining

part IV: Topics in information economics

• chapter sixteen: Moral hazard and incentives 577
• chapter seventeen: Adverse selection and market signaling 625
• chapter eighteen: The revelation principle and mechanism design

part V: Firms and transactions

• chapter nineteen: Theories of the firm 723
• cost economics and the firm 743
• appendix one: Constrained optimization

appendix two: Dynamic programming
addendttm to the second and
subsequent printings
index