Chapter 1 The game of chess Chapter 2 Games in extensive and strategic forms Chapter 3 Games with perfect information Chapter 4 Repeated games with complete information Chapter 5 Repeated games of incomplete information Zero-sum Chapter 6 Repeated games of incomplete information Non-zero-sum Chapter 7 Noncooperative models of bargaining Chapter 8 Strategic analysis of auctions Chapter 9 Location Chapter 10 Strategic models of entry deterrence Chapter 11 Patent licensing Chapter 12 The core and balancedness Chapter 13 Axiomatizations of the core Chapter 14 The core in perfectly competitive economies Chapter 15 The core in imperfectly competitive economies Chapter 16 Two-sided matching Chapter 17 Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets Chapter 18 The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus Chapter 19 Game and decision theoretic models in ethics
Chapter 20 Zero-sum two-person games Chapter 21 Game theory and statistics Chapter 22 Differential games Chapter 23 Differential games Economic applications Chapter 24 Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility Chapter 25 Signalling Chapter 26 Moral hazard Chapter 27 Search Chapter 28 Game theory and evolutionary biology Chapter 29 Game theory models of peace and war Chapter 30 Voting procedures Chapter 31 Social choice Chapter 32 Power and stability in politics Chapter 33 Game theory and public economics Chapter 34 Cost allocation Chapter 35 Cooperative models of bargaining Chapter 36 Games in coalitional form Chapter 37 Coalition structures Chapter 38 Game-theoretic aspects of computing Chapter 39 Utility and subjective probability Chapter 40 Common Knowledge
Chapter 41 Strategic equilibrium Chapter 42 Foundations of strategic equilibrium Chapter 43 Incomplete information Chapter 44 Non-zero-sum two-person games Chapter 45 Computing equilibria for two-person games Chapter 46 Non-cooperative games with many players Chapter 47 Stochastic games Chapter 48 Stochastic games Recent results Chapter 49 Game theory and industrial organization Chapter 50 Bargaining with incomplete information Chapter 51 Inspection games Chapter 52 Economic history and game theory Chapter 53 The shapley value Chapter 54 Variations on the shapley value Chapter 55 Values of non-transferable utility games Chapter 56 Values of games with infinitely many players Chapter 57 Values of perfectly competitive economies Chapter 58 Some other economic applications of the value Chapter 59 Strategic aspects of political systems Chapter 60 Game-theoretic analysis of legal rules and institutions Chapter 61 Implementation theory Chapter 62 Game theory and experimental gaming |