CONTENTS:

1 Introduction  1
 
2 Hidden Information, Screening 47
 
3 Hidden Information, Signaling 99
 
4 Hidden Action, Moral Hazard 129
 
5 Disclosure of Private Certifiable Information 171
 
6 Multidimensional Incentive Problems 199
 
II Static Multilateral Contracting 237
 
7 Multilateral Asymmetric Information: Bilateral Trading and Auctions 239
 
8 Multiagent Moral Hazard and Collusion 297
 
III Repeated Bilateral Contracting 365
 
9 Dynamic Adverse Selection 367
 
10 Dynamic Moral Hazard 419
 
IV Incomplete Contracts 487
 
11 Incomplete Contracts and Institution Design 489
 
12 Foundations of Contracting with Unverifiable Information 553
 
13 Markets and Contracts 601
 
 Appendix 645
 
14 Exercises 647