本书内容如下：

1 Theoretical framework 1
1.1 Introduction and examples 1
1.2 Representation of a game in extensive form 4
1.3 Representation of a game in strategic form 12
1.4 Mixed extension of a game 16
Supplementary material 18
1.5 Mixed and behavioral strategies 18
1.6 Representation of a game in coalitional form 23
Summary 26
Exercises 26
2 Strategic-form analysis: theory 30
2.1 Dominance and iterative dominance 30
2.2 Nash equilibrium 35
2.3 Zero-sum bilateral games 45
Supplementary material 50
2.4 Nash equilibrium: formal existence results 50
2.5 Strong and coalition-proof equilibria 53
2.6 Correlated equilibrium 56
2.7 Rationalizability 61
Summary 68
Exercises 69
3 Strategic-form analysis: applications 72
3.1 Oligopoly (I): static models 72
3.2 Mechanism design (I): efficient allocation of public goods 83
3.3 Mechanism design (II): Nash implementation 90
3.4 Markets (I): macroeconomic coordination failures 99
Summary 104
Exercises 105
4 Refinements of Nash equilibrium: theory 110
4.1 Introduction 110
4.2 Refinements excluding “incredible threats”: examples 110
4.3 Subgame-perfect equilibrium 115
4.4 Weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium 117
Supplementary material 120

4.5 Refinements excluding “untenable beliefs”: examples 120
4.6 Sequential equilibrium 128
4.7 Perfect and proper equilibria 131
4.8 Strategic-form refinements 135
Summary 143
Exercises 144
5 Refinements of Nash equilibrium: applications 151
5.1 Oligopoly (II): sequential moves 151
5.2 Markets (II): decentralized price formation 159
5.3 Oligopoly (III): differentiated products 171
5.4 Mechanism design (III): efficient allocation of an indivisible object 176
Summary 182
Exercises 184
6 Incomplete information: theory 188
6.1 Introduction and examples 188
6.2 Bayesian games 191
6.3 Bayes-Nash equilibrium 196
6.4 Signaling games 204
Supplementary material 217
6.5 Mixed strategies, revisited: a purification approach 217
6.6 Forward induction 221
Summary 225
Exercises 226
7 Incomplete information: applications 231
7.1 Markets (III): signaling in the labor market 231
7.2 Markets (IV): insurance markets and adverse selection 244
7.3 Mechanism design (IV): one-sided auctions 254
7.4 Mechanism design (V): buyer–seller trade 267
Summary 275
Exercises 276
8 Repeated interaction: theory 281
8.1 Introduction and examples 281
8.2 Repeated games: basic theoretical framework 283
8.3 Folk theorems: Nash equilibrium 286
8.4 Reputation and “irrationality”: informal discussion 294
Supplementary material 300
8.5 Folk theorems: subgame-perfect equilibrium 300
8.6 Reputation and “irrationality”: formal analysis 311
Summary 319
Exercises 321
9 Repeated interaction: applications 324
9.1 Oligopoly (IV): intertemporal collusion in a Cournot scenario 324
9.2 Oligopoly (V): intertemporal collusion in a Bertrand scenario 334
9.3 Markets (V): efficiency wages and unemployment 341
Summary 351
Exercises 352

10 Evolution and rationality 355
10.1 Introduction 355
10.2 Static analysis 356
10.3 Basic dynamic analysis 363
10.4 Evolution in social environments 372
10.5 Evolution of cooperation: an example 387
Summary 393
Exercises 394
11 Learning to play 398
11.1 Introduction 398
11.2 Reinforcement learning 399
11.3 Static perceptions and myopic behavior 412
11.4 Memory, expectations, and foresight 420
Summary 441
Exercises 442
12 Social learning and equilibrium selection 446
12.1 Introduction 446
12.2 Evolutionary games: theoretical framework 447
12.3 Evolutionary games: alternative scenarios 449
12.4 Stochastic stability and equilibrium selection 453
12.5 Experimental evidence 470
Supplementary material 474
12.6 Perturbed Markov processes: basic concepts and techniques 474
12.7 Reinforcement learning with flexible aspirations 482
Summary 495
Exercises 496
Bibliography 501
Index 507