Paperback: 796 pages
Publisher: The MIT Press (22 April 2008)
Language English
Synopsis
This book features experts who examine the application of economic theory to antitrust issues in both the United States and Europe, discussing mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance, and the impact of market features.Over the past twenty years, economic theory has begun to play a central role in antitrust matters. In earlier days, the application of antitrust rules was viewed almost entirely in formal terms; now it is widely accepted that the proper interpretation of these rules requires an understanding of how markets work and how firms can alter their efficient functioning. The "Handbook of Antitrust Economics" offers scholars, students, administrators, courts, companies, and lawyers the economist's view of the subject, describing the application of newly developed theoretical models and improved empirical methods to antitrust and competition law in both the United States and the European Union. (The book uses the U.S. term "antitrust law" and the European "competition law" interchangeably, emphasizing the commonalities between the two jurisdictions.)
After a general discussion of the use of empirical methods in antitrust cases, the Handbook covers mergers, agreements, abuses of dominance (or unilateral conducts), and market features that affect the way firms compete. The chapters examine such topics as analyzing the competitive effects of both horizontal and vertical mergers, detecting and preventing cartels, theoretical and empirical analysis of vertical restraints, state aids, the relationship of competition law to the defense of intellectual property, and the application of antitrust law to "bidding markets," network industries, and two-sided markets.

Contents
Contributors vii
Introduction ix
1 Economic Evidence in Antitrust: Defining Markets and Measuring Market Power 1
Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan
2 Unilateral Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers 43
Gregory J. Werden and Luke M. Froeb
3 The Coordinated Effects of Mergers 105
Kai-Uwe Ku¨ hn
4 Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration 145
Michael H. Riordan
5 Analysis of Conglomerate Effects in EU Merger Control 183
Damien J. Neven
6 Detecting Cartels 213
Joseph E. Harrington Jr.
7 Leniency and Whistleblowers in Antitrust 259
Giancarlo Spagnolo
8 Facilitating Practices 305
Paolo Buccirossi
9 Economics of Vertical Restraints 353
Patrick Rey and Thibaud Verge´
10 Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints: Empirical Evidence and Public Policy 391
Francine Lafontaine and Margaret Slade
11 Abuse of Market Power 415
John Vickers
12 Price Discrimination 433
Mark Armstrong
13 Public Policy in Network Industries 469
Nicholas Economides
14 Competition Policy for Intellectual Property 519
Richard J. Gilbert
15 Competition Policy in Two-Sided Markets, with a Special Emphasis on Payment
Cards 543
Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole
16 Competition Policy in Auctions and ‘‘Bidding Markets’’ 583
Paul Klemperer
17 European State Aid Control: An Economic Framework 625
Hans W. Friederiszick, Lars-Hendrik Ro¨ ller, and Vincent Verouden
Index 671