掏空、合谋与激励合约：对独立董事报酬的一个理论贡献
董志强*
(April 24, 2005, first draft)
摘要：对独立董事应支付固定报酬还是激励报酬，是一个有争议的话题。本文建
立了一个“全体股东/独立董事/大股东”三层代理模型，贡献了一个关于独立董
事报酬合约的经济理论。发现：大股东的掏空动机依赖于其实现控制企业的股权
水平，越小的股权控制企业则掏空动机越强烈；当独立董事合谋概率较小(比如
有完善的独立董事市场激励和约束)或投资者法律保护水平较高的时候，则应当
对独立董事支付固定报酬；而独立董事合谋概率较大且法律对投资者保护水平较
低的时候，为了尽可能维护全体股东的利益，就有必要对独立董事支付激励报酬。
本文结论对我国公司治理中独立董事报酬有明显的政策含义。
关键词：合谋 独立董事报酬 大股东 掏空 公司治理
Tunneling, Collusion and Incentive Contract: A Contribution to
Theory of Independent Director Compensations
Dong Zhiqiang
ABSTRACT: It is debatable that the independent directors should be paid by fixed
compensations or incentive compensations. This paper makes an “all stock holders /
independent director / controlling stock holder” three-tie hierarchy model so that
makes an economic theory contribution to independent compensation. And finds that:
the motivation of tunneling from controlling stock holder depend on the proportion of
ownership with which the controlling stock holder realize the control of the firm, the
less the proportion of ownership from controlling stock holder is, the more strong
motivation of tunneling is; and the fixed compensation is more suitable to be paid to
independent director if the collusion probability is little (such as there is an effective
independent director market) or the level of investor protection of the law is high; and
the incentive compensation is more suitable when collusion probability is great and
the investor protection is poor. The policy implications of conclusions from this paper
to independent director compensation in corporate governance are very clear.
KEY WORDS: Collusion; Independent Director Compensation; Controlling Stock
Holder; Tunneling; Corporate Governance
JEL Classification:G30; G38; D74